

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 020060
ORIGIN ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 FEA-01 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-01
INR-07 IO-13 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04
PRS-01 SAJ-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 DODE-00
NSC-05 /091 R

DRAFTED BY ACDA/IR:JYOUNG:CF
APPROVED BY ACDA/IR:MHUMPHREYS
EUR:JHAWES

-----291933Z 109428 /41
R 282048Z JAN 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY BONN
USDEL MBFR VIENNA

S E C R E T STATE 020060

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS:PARM, NATO, MBFR

SUBJECT:MBFR: REVISED FRG PAPER ON DISCUSSION ON DATA AND
DEFINITIONS

REF: NATO 355 (DTG 211625Z JAN 77)

FOR YOUR INFORMATION, TEXT OF REVISED FRG PAPER ON DEFINI-
TIONS FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT:

1. IN CONNECTION WITH ITS MOST RECENT DATA INFORMATION
TABLED AT THE END OF THE 10TH ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS, THE
WEST EXPRESSED THE EXPECTATION THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO
BEGIN A CONCRETE DISCUSSION ON DEFINITIONS AND COUNTINGS IN
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THE 11TH-ROUND. THE EASTERN SIDE HAS MADE THE FULFILLMENT
OF THE WESTERN ASSURANCE TO TABLE NEW DATA OF-ITS OWN A
CONDITION FOR THE BEGINNING OF SUCH A DISCUSSION. THIS
CONDITION WAS MET WHEN THE DATA WERE PROVIDED IN DECEMBER 197

2. AFTER THE EASTERN DATA SUBMISSION OF JUNE 1976, A CONCRET
COMPARISON OF THE NUMERICAL CONCEPTS OF BOTH SIDES HAS
BECOME POSSIBLE. IT IS NO LONGER NECESSARY TO CONFINE OUR-
SELVES TO GENERAL STATEMENTS CONCERNING THE FORCE SIZES USED
AS A BASIS BY THE TWO SIDES. THE ESSENTIAL RESULT OF THE

COMPARISON BETWEEN THE WESTERN FIGURES FOR THE WARSAW PACT AND THOSE TABLED BY THE WARSAW PACT ITSELF ARE THE CONSIDERABLE DISCREPANCIES WHICH HAVE EMERGED. THESE DISCREPANCIES AMOUNT TO 151,000 MEN IN THE CASE OF THE WP GROUND FORCES AND TO 163,000 MEN IN THE CASE OF GROUND AND AIR FORCES COMBINED.

3. IT CANNOT BE ASSUMED THAT THE EASTERN FIGURES ARE EXCLUSIVELY DUE TO AN ATTEMPT TO DECEIVE THE WEST. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE DIFFERENCES ARE SO GREAT THAT THEY CANNOT BE EXPLAINED BY A NORMAL MARGIN OF ERROR ON BOTH SIDES. THE DIVERGENCIES THEREFORE SUGGEST THAT THEY ARE DUE TO THE CONSIDERATION OF DIFFERENT FORCE CATEGORIES IN THE WESTERN AS WELL AS THE EASTERN FIGURES. IN OTHER WORDS, THE EAST AND THE WEST PROVIDE DIFFERENT ANSWERS TO THE QUESTION WHAT IS TO BE COUNTED.

4. THE PRIORITY TASK WHICH SHOULD BE SOLVED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IS THEREFORE THE ATTEMPT TO ANSWER THE QUESTION "WHAT HAS BEEN COUNTED IN THE PRESENTATION OF THESE FIGURES" AND, IF POSSIBLE, TO OBTAIN A BINDING AGREEMENT ON THE CRITERIA. ON THE BACKGROUND OF THE NUMERICAL DISCREPANCIES WHICH HAVE MERGED, IT IS NOT IMMEDIATELY NECESSARY TO TALK IN TERMS OF CONCRETE FIGURES. THE DISCUSSION SHOULD BE CONCENTRATED ON THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PERSONNEL TO BE COUNTED.

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5. ANOTHER QUESTION TO BE CLARIFIED IN VIENNA SHOULD BE "HOW DO WE COUNT." THIS RAISES THE QUESTION OF THE COUNTING METHODS. A FURTHER STEP IN THE DIRECTION OF A DEFINITION OF THE FIGURES TO BE COMPARED COULD BE TAKEN IN THIS WAY.

6. IT WILL BE OBVIOUS THAT SUCH A DISCUSSION WILL BE OF SUBSTANTIAL IMPORTANCE FOR THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS IN GENERAL. IT IS THEREFORE NECESSARY THAT NATO SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO THE ADOPTION OF A COMMON TACTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE POSITION FOR DEALING WITH THIS QUESTION. THE PRESENT WORKING PAPER SERVES THE PURPOSE OF INTRODUCING SUCH A CONSULTATION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.

7. IT APPEARS NECESSARY TO US TO DISTINGUISH TERMINOLOGICAL BETWEEN THE TWO STEPS INDICATED ABOVE. WE SUGGEST AS A WORKING BASIS THAT THE FOLLOWING TWO TERMS SHOULD BE USED:

--"COUNTING CRITERIA" TO EXPLAIN WHAT WILL BE COUNTED. THIS WOULD BE A DEFINITION OF THE PERSONNEL TO BE COUNTED,

--"COUNTING RULES" TO EXPLAIN HOW THE COUNTING WILL TAKE

SECRET

PLACE. THIS TERM WOULD RELATE TO THE METHODS OF COUNTING THE PERSONNEL.

COUNTING CRITERIA

8. IN TABLING ITS DATA IN DECEMBER, THE WEST USED THE FORMULA "UNIFORMED ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY (GROUND FORCE) PERSONNEL." THIS FORMULA CONTAINS THE COUNTING CRITERIA WHICH FORM THE BASIS OF THE CATEGORIES OF PERSONNEL COUNTED BY THE WEST:

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--"UNIFORMED" INTRODUCES INTO THE DISCUSSION A SIMPLE AND HANDY CRITERION. IT EXCLUDES NON-UNIFORMED PERSONNEL,

--"ACTIVE DUTY" RELATES TO THE FORCES IN BEING IN PEACETIME. IT EXCLUDES RESERVISTS,

--"MILITARY" MEANS A DISTINCTION COMPARED WITH THE NON-MILITARY UNIFORMED PERSONNEL ON ACTIVE SERVICE.

9. A DISCUSSION OF THE FORMULA CONTAINING THE COUNTING CRITERIA COULD FOLLOW ON THE DISCUSSION OF THE QUESTION OF "COMPREHENSIVENESS" IN EARLIER ROUNDS OF NEGOTIATION. THE FORMULA QUOTED WOULD COVER ALL THE PERSONNEL WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE INCLUDED INTO THE COUNT. EVERYTHING THAT IS NOT COVERED BY THESE CRITERIA WOULD NOT BE COUNTED (RESERVISTS, CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES, FRONTIER FORCES, MILITIAS, ETC.).

10. IT IS TO BE EXPECTED THAT THE MAIN PROBLEM WILL LIE IN THE QUESTION OF HOW TO DEAL WITH CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES OF THE ARMED FORCES OR, INVERSELY, THE ARITHMETICAL EXCLUSION OF MILITARY PERSONNEL ON THE EASTERN SIDE PERFORMING SIMILAR FUNCTIONS. THIS MAY BE ONE OF THE REASONS FOR THE DISCREPANCIES EXISTING BETWEEN THE FIGURES TABLED BY THE EAST AND THOSE TABLED BY THE WEST. NATO WILL THEREFORE HAVE TO BE PREPARED TO FIND CONVINCING ARGUMENTS FOR THE INCLUSION OF THIS EASTERN MILITARY PERSONNEL AND THE EXCLUSION OF WESTERN CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES.

COUNTING RULES

11. THIS WOULD BE AN ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE AN ANSWER TO THE QUESTION HOW THE MANPOWER CATEGORIES DEFINED BY THE COUNTING CRITERIA ARE TO BE COUNTED. THE TASK TO WHICH NATO SHOULD GIVE ITS ATTENTION FIRST WOULD BE TO PROCESS THE WORK ALREADY DONE IN THE WORKING GROUP AND TO REDUCE
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IT TO THE ELEMENTS, WHICH ARE RELEVANT FOR THE ADOPTION OF THE COUNTING RULES. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THE WORKING GROUP SHOULD BE ENTRUSTED WITH THIS TASK.

12. THE PROBLEM OF THE COUNTING RULES COMPRISES THE CLARIFICATION OF THE QUESTION WHETHER THE DATA SHOULD BE BASED ON A FIXED DATE FOR A COUNT, OR THE ANNUAL AVERAGE STRENGTH OR THE PEACETIME AUTHORIZED STRENGTH. WE CONSIDER IT DESIRABLE TO ARRIVE AT UNIFORM COUNTING RULES FOR THE WESTERN SIDE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AT LEAST, NATO SHOULD AGREE HOW WESTERN DATA ARE TO BE EXPLAINED TO THE EASTERN SIDE.

13. WE BELIEVE THAT THE BREAKDOWN OF DATA ACCORDING TO ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS OR NATIONALITY WILL NOT BECOME AN URGENT PROBLEM UNTIL NEW DATA TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE AGREED COUNTING CRITERIA AND COUNTING RULES SHOW THAT MAJOR DISCREPANCIES STILL PERSIST. THE BREAKDOWNS WOULD THEN HAVE THE FUNCTION OF FURTHER CLARIFYING THE REASONS FOR SUCH DISCREPANCIES. THIS SUBJECT SHOULD BE EXAMINED IN DETAIL WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.

14. A FURTHER STEP IN THE DATA AND DEFINITIONAL DISCUSSION IS THE CLARIFICATION OF THE EXISTING ANOMALIES, E.G., THE REDISTRIBUTION OF THE ALLOCATION OF THOSE CATEGORIES OF PERSONNEL WHICH ARE AT PRESENT ALLOCATED IN DIFFERENT WAYS. IN OUR OPINION, THIS DISCUSSION OF THE ALLOCATION OF ANOMALIES WHICH HAS UP TO NOW BEEN DESCRIBED IN VIENNA AS "REDEFINITION" OR "REALLOCATION" SHOULD ONLY BE RESUMED WHEN THE DISCUSSIONS ON COUNTING CRITERIA AND COUNTING RULES HAVE REACHED AN ADVANCED STAGE.

15. WHEN DISCUSSING THE ANOMALIES WE CAN HAVE RECOURSE TO THE DISCUSSION WHICH ALREADY TOOK PLACE IN VIENNA. THERE IS A LARGE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT THAT THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS ARE ALLOCATED TO GROUND OR AIR FORCES IN DIFFERENT
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WAYS AND ARE THEREFORE TO BE THE SUBJECT OF THE DISCUSSION ON ANOMALIES:

--PERSONNEL OF AIR DEFENSE UNITS ON THE GROUND

--HELICOPTER PERSONNEL

--PERSONNEL OF THE GROUND-TO-GROUND MISSILE UNITS.

16. THERE MAY BE FURTHER ANOMALIES IN ADDITION TO THESE THREE ANOMALIES ALREADY IDENTIFIED. WE SHOULD CONFINE OURSELVES TO THESE KNOWN ANOMALIES IN VIENNA BUT SHOULD TRY TO CLARIFY THE QUESTION OF ADDITIONAL ANOMALIES (SUCH

AS ADDITIONAL SERVICES)WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. THE FOLLOWING
FUNDAMENTAL OBSERVATIONS ARE OFFERED ON THE PROBLEM OF
THE REALLOCATION OF ANOMALIES.

17. THE PROBLEM HAS LOST SOME OF ITS IMPORTANCE SINCE
THE INCLUSION OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER INTO THE COMBINED
COMMON CEILING. A REALLOCATION OF ANOMALIES WOULD ONLY
LEAD TO MINOR CHANGES IN THE DISPARITIES BETWEEN GROUND
FORCE MANPOWER FIGURES. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT WOULD
CONSIDERABLY INCREASE THE DISPARITIES IN AIR FORCE
MANPOWER WHICH WOULD THEN HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT
DURING THE REDUCTION PROCESS.

18. THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE COMBINED COMMON COLLECTIVE
CEILING WITH ITS RETENTION OF THE COMMON COLLECTIVE
CEILING FOR GROUND FORCES PERMITS BOTH SIDES TO BE
FLEXIBLE WITH REGARD TO THE SIZE OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER.
HOWEVER, THIS IS ONLY POSSIBLE AT THE EXPENSE OF A REDUC-
TION OF THE CEILING FOR GROUND FORCES BELOW THE AGREED
COLLECTIVE CEILING. IN CASE THAT THE ANOMALIES ARE
REALLOCATED, THE WARSAW PACT WOULD THEREFORE BE FACED WITH
THE ALTERNATIVE:

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--EITHER TO REDUCE THE AIR FORCE MANPOWER BY THIS INCREASE
IN ORDER TO COME BACK TO APPROXIMATE PARITY FOR AIR FORCE
MANPOWER,

--OR TO REDUCE THE GROUND FORCE MANPOWER ADDITIONALLY BY
THE SIZE OF THE REALLOCATED ANOMALIES IN ORDER TO COMPEN-
SATE FOR THE RETENTION OF THE SUPERIOR AIR FORCE MANPOWER.

19. THE QUESTION ARISES WHETHER THE PROBLEM OF THE
ANOMALIES SHOULD NOT BE SEEN IN A NEW LIGHT IN VIEW OF THE
ADDITION OF THE IDEA OF A COMBINED CEILING TO THE WESTERN
NEGOTIATION PROPOSAL.

20. THE WORK TO BE DONE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE CAN IN OUR
OPINION BE SUMMED UP AS FOLLOWS:

--CONSOLIDATION AND EVALUATION OF THE WORK DONE UP TO NOW,

--CONFIRMATION OF THE COUNTING CRITERIA,

--DETERMINATION OF UNIFORM COUNTING RULES FOR THE WEST,

--DISCUSSION OF THE PROCEDURE FOR THE DEFINITIONAL
DISCUSSION,

--(AT A LATER DATE:) CLARIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM OF
ANOMALIES.

21. AS FAR AS THE NEGOTIATION TACTICS TO BE PURSUED IN
VIENNA ARE CONCERNED, THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

WOULD SUGGEST ITSELF:

A) DISCUSSION OF THOSE REASONS WHICH DETERMINE THE DIS-
CREPANCIES WHICH HAVE BECOME APPARENT, IN OTHER WORDS:
AGREEMENT OF THE EASTERN SIDE TO A DISCUSSION OF THE
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COUNTING CRITERIA AND COUNTING RULES,

B) DISCUSSION OF THE COUNTING CRITERIA AND THUS A REPLY
TO THE QUESTION WHICH CATEGORIES SHOULD BE COUNTED IN THE
MBFR CONTEXT. FOR THIS NO NEW DETAILED DATA ARE REQUIRED
WHICH WOULD GO BEYOND THE GLOBAL DATA,

C) THE DISCUSSION OF THE COUNTING RULES, I.E., AGREEMENT
ON HOW THE COUNTING IS TO BE DONE,

D) AFTER THIS SECOND STEP, THE QUESTION POSES ITSELF
WHETHER THE TWO SIDES SHOULD TABLE NEW DATA. END TEXT
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ORIGIN ACDA-04

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /005 R

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DRAFTED BY: ACDA/IR:JYOUNG
ACDA/IR:MHUMPHREYS

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R 162050Z FEB 77

FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUDORRA/USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

S E C R E T STATE 020060

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 020060 SENT ACTION LONDON BONN MBFR VIENNA
28 JAN 77

QUOTE S E C R E T STATE 020060

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS:PARM, NATO, MBFR

SUBJECT:MBFR: REVISED FRG PAPER ON DISCUSSION ON DATA AND DEFINITIONS

REF: NATO 355 (DTG 211625Z JAN 77)

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SECRET

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BEGIN A CONCRETE DISCUSSION ON DEFINITIONS AND COUNTINGS IN THE 11TH-ROUND. THE EASTERN SIDE HAS MADE THE FULFILLMENT OF THE WESTERN ASSURANCE TO TABLE NEW DATA OF-ITS OWN A CONDITION FOR THE BEGINNING OF SUCH A DISCUSSION. THIS CONDITION WAS MET WHEN THE DATA WERE PROVIDED IN DECEMBER 197

2. AFTER THE EASTERN DATA SUBMISSION OF JUNE 1976, A CONCRET COMPARISON OF THE NUMERICAL CONCEPTS OF BOTH SIDES HAS BECOME POSSIBLE. IT IS NO LONGER NECESSARY TO CONFINE OURSELVES TO GENERAL STATEMENTS CONCERNING THE FORCE SIZES USED AS A BASIS BY THE TWO SIDES. THE ESSENTIAL RESULT OF THE COMPARISON BETWEEN THE WESTERN FIGURES FOR THE WARSAW PACT AND THOSE TABLED BY THE WARSAW PACT ITSELF ARE THE CONSIDERABLE DISCREPANCIES WHICH HAVE EMERGED. THESE DISCREPANCIES AMOUNT TO 151,000 MEN IN THE CASE OF THE WP GROUND FORCES AND TO 163,000 MEN IN THE CASE OF GROUND AND AIR FORCES COMBINED.

3. IT CANNOT BE ASSUMED THAT THE EASTERN FIGURES ARE EXCLUSIVELY DUE TO AN ATTEMPT TO DECEIVE THE WEST. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE DIFFERENCES ARE SO GREAT THAT THEY CANNOT BE EXPLAINED BY A NORMAL MARGIN OF ERROR ON BOTH SIDES. THE DIVERGENCIES THEREFORE SUGGEST THAT THEY ARE DUE TO THE CONSIDERATION OF DIFFERENT FORCE CATEGORIES IN THE WESTERN AS WELL AS THE EASTERN FIGURES. IN OTHER WORDS, THE EAST AND THE WEST PROVIDE DIFFERENT ANSWERS TO THE QUESTION WHAT IS TO BE COUNTED.

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16. THERE MAY BE FURTHER ANOMALIES IN ADDITION TO THESE THREE ANOMALIES ALREADY IDENTIFIED. WE SHOULD CONFINE OURSELVES TO THESE KNOWN ANOMALIES IN VIENNA BUT SHOULD TRY TO CLARIFY THE QUESTION OF ADDITIONAL ANOMALIES (SUCH AS ADDITIONAL SERVICES) WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. THE FOLLOWING FUNDAMENTAL OBSERVATIONS ARE OFFERED ON THE PROBLEM OF THE REALLOCATION OF ANOMALIES.

17. THE PROBLEM HAS LOST SOME OF ITS IMPORTANCE SINCE THE INCLUSION OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER INTO THE COMBINED COMMON CEILING. A REALLOCATION OF ANOMALIES WOULD ONLY LEAD TO MINOR CHANGES IN THE DISPARITIES BETWEEN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER FIGURES. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT WOULD CONSIDERABLY INCREASE THE DISPARITIES IN AIR FORCE MANPOWER WHICH WOULD THEN HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT DURING THE REDUCTION PROCESS.

18. THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE COMBINED COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING WITH ITS RETENTION OF THE COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING FOR GROUND FORCES PERMITS BOTH SIDES TO BE FLEXIBLE WITH REGARD TO THE SIZE OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER. HOWEVER, THIS IS ONLY POSSIBLE AT THE EXPENSE OF A REDUCTION OF THE CEILING FOR GROUND FORCES BELOW THE AGREED COLLECTIVE CEILING. IN CASE THAT THE ANOMALIES ARE REALLOCATED, THE WARSAW PACT WOULD THEREFORE BE FACED WITH THE ALTERNATIVE:
SECRET

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--EITHER TO REDUCE THE AIR FORCE MANPOWER BY THIS INCREASE
IN ORDER TO COME BACK TO APPROXIMATE PARITY FOR AIR FORCE
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--OR TO REDUCE THE GROUND FORCE MANPOWER ADDITIONALLY BY
THE SIZE OF THE REALLOCATED ANOMALIES IN ORDER TO COMPEN-
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A) DISCUSSION OF THOSE REASONS WHICH DETERMINE THE DIS-
CREPANCIES WHICH HAVE BECOME APPARENT, IN OTHER WORDS:
SECRET

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AGREEMENT OF THE EASTERN SIDE TO A DISCUSSION OF THE
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B) DISCUSSION OF THE COUNTING CRITERIA AND THUS A REPLY
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D) AFTER THIS SECOND STEP, THE QUESTION POSES ITSELF
WHETHER THE TWO SIDES SHOULD TABLE NEW DATA. END TEXT
VANCE

UNQUOTE HARTMAN

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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 22-Sep-1999 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLICIES, DATA, NEGOTIATIONS, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, FORCE & TROOP LEVELS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 28-Jan-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
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Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
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Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: ACDA/IR:JYOUNG:CF
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Expiration:
Film Number: D770033-0312
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770193/baaevdm.tel
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Litigation History:
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Message ID: 139884de-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
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Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 11
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: NATO 355 (DTG 211625Z JAN 77)
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 26-Oct-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3681855
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: REVISED FRG PAPER ON DISCUSSION ON DATA AND DEFINITIONS
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR
To: LONDON BONN MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/139884de-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
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